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TOWARDS THE MILLENNIUM DEVELOPMENT GOALS
Introduction
THE SOUTH AFRICAN Constitution gives responsibility for
water supply and sanitation to local government. This role
is defined in the Water Services Act as:
• ensure access: this involves developing policies and
systems that enable the sustainable provision of water
services;
• planning: this involves prioritising and planning how
services should be extended and how they should be
managed;
• institutional arrangements for water services provision:
this refers to making informed decisions in selecting
water services providers; and
• regulation: this refers to passing and enforcing bylaws
that govern the provision of water services.
Under this arrangement, local government is not obliged to
physically provide services itself. Indeed, both the Water
Services Act and the Local Government: Municipal Systems
Act allow for a wide range of partnerships which local
government can enter into with other parties to ensure that
services are provided.
Despite the executive authority given to local government,
national and provincial government is required to support,
monitor and regulate local government in the execution of
its duties. National government also provides the overall
legislative and policy environment and promulgates
regulations covering key aspects such as standards, tariffs
and compulsory provisions for contracts.
Parastatal organisations or water boards have been set up
to provide bulk water supply and sanitation services (and
in some cases retail services), and are contracted by local
government to do this. Some water boards are resource
centres of technical and commercial expertise that can be
used to assist local government. For example, Rand Water
has a number of management contracts with municipalities
to establish functional ring-fenced water supply and
sanitation units.
The private sector has a role as water services providers,
again contracted or appointed by local government. There
are a number of concession-type contracts and management
contracts operational between private sector operators and
municipalities. The private sector, of course, also provides
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a range of other services relating to the design and
construction of new schemes and service contracts for the
operation and maintenance of service components such as
water treatment works.
National policy encourages the use of community based
organisations (CBOs) as providers to operate and maintain
services in rural areas where provision by either public or
private providers is often not feasible. This arrangement
can be facilitated by the municipality, an NGO or a private
sector concern. The model that is promoted by the
Department of Water Affairs and Forestry (DWAF) is
where a CBO is appointed by the municipality to manage
a service (normally a water supply), but with support from
either the municipality itself, an NGO or a private sector
company to build its capacity, undertake maintenance that
the community cannot do on its own and to monitor the
accounts and administrative procedures.
The environment for the private sector and CBO
management of schemes has certain difficulties and these
are dealt with later in this paper. It is notable that both the
water services act and the local government: Municipal
Systems Act, effectively indicate that the public sector is the
preferred supplier of services. Furthermore, an agreement
between the Congress of South African Trade Unions
(COSATU), the South African Municipal Workers Union
(SAMWU) and the South African Local Government
Association (SALGA) signed in December 1998 includes
the principle that the public sector is the preferred option
for service delivery (RSDN, 2000).
Observations against key markers of
decentralisation
General
Devolution is when national government transfers authority
for decision-making, finance and management to local
government with clearly defined jurisdictions (both
geographical and functional) over which local government
can exercise that authority. Devolution also involves the
concept of local government being primarily accountable
to its constituents as opposed to national government and
power and authority is shifted away from the centre.
Studies of decentralisation of service delivery have revealed
key factors that are crucial in determining the success of
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decentralisation. The South African context is compared
below against some of these key markers.
Local government needs the authority to
carry out its functions
In terms of legislation, local government in South Africa has
great freedom to allocate spending as well as to decide on
organisational structures and staffing. Local government,
through its statutory Integrated Development Planning
(IDP) process, identifies its priorities and decides on strategies
to address these, in consultation with the communities it
represents. This IDP process should be the basis for
determining budgets and spending plans. In practice,
however, lack of capacity in local government often means
that the task of preparing IDPs is farmed out to consultants.
As a consequence these documents are weak, have not been
developed in a participatory manner, do not have political
buy-in and consist just of a wish-list of infrastructure
projects that are also not linked to municipal budgets and
spending programmes (National Treasury, 2001).
Furthermore, most transfers of funds from national to local
government have strong conditionalities attached, and
spending is closely monitored (with the notable exception
of the equitable share) in order to ensure that national
sector priorities such as universal access are addressed.
A good example of the control exercised by national
government is the Community Water Supply and Sanitation
(CWSS) programme administered by DWAF. When this
programme commenced in 1994, due to the absence of
local government, DWAF was directly implementing and
operating water and sanitation projects in rural areas,
many of which had been inherited from the former homeland
administrations. Many of these are reported to have major
sustainability problems (RSDN, 1998 and Financial Mail,
2000). A number of local governments are now refusing to
take transfer of such projects on the basis that they are
unsustainable and were carried out without input from
themselves. Thus, DWAF has ursurped the functions of
local government and it is now very difficult to transfer
these functions, assets and staff to local government as
these have been institutionalised within DWAF (based on
Leon 2001 and interviews with DWAF and local government
officials).
Local government needs capacity to fulfil its
mandate
On one hand, literature on decentralisation presses home
the point that national government must give local
government flexibility to exercise its choices. On the other
hand, however, it stresses the need for national government
to ensure sound financial management of funds and to
make sure that local government is held accountable (World
Bank, 2002a). It is reported that in India, the Philippines
and Uganda inadequate financial management and technical
capacity of local government, inhibits national governments
from “letting go”.
Similar issues exist in South Africa. Reliable financial
information on local government is very difficult to obtain
mainly due to outdated budgetary systems and procedures
and fragmented data that exists in most municipalities.
This is partly due to lack of financial management and
budgeting capacity as well as the transitions that have taken
place over the last five years. The financial management
systems of many local governments often do not allow for
identifying costs and revenue streams from a particular
service (for example, it is rarely possible to work out the
cost of water services provision and revenue gained from
it). This in turn means that it is not possible for municipalities
to calculate, let alone charge, tariffs that reflect the actual
costs incurred for providing such a service (National
Treasury, 2001). Thus, national government departments,
feel they have to keep a tight control over how funds are
disbursed. This creates friction with local government,
which feels that the funds actually belong to them, and
therefore, object to the conditions laid down by national.
Local government needs adequate financial
resources
Another major lesson from international experience is the
need to allocate financial resources to local government to
enable it to perform its functions. Inadequate funding of
devolved functions results in an “unfunded mandate”
where resources are lacking to perform a function. This
inevitably results in the deterioration of the service. Brillantes
and Cuachon, 2002). Experience from Uganda, India and
Philippines as well as other countries suggests that for a
variety of reasons national governments are not willing to
provide adequate unconditional financial resources to local
government Brillantes and Cuachon, 2002).
In terms of the distribution of resources, South Africa is
a shared revenue model - national revenue is shared between
the different spheres of government. However, national
government decides on the allocation of the revenue between
the spheres. This may account for why the unconditional
allocation to cover recurrent costs of basic services to the
poor to local government for the financial year 2001/2002
was only 1.3% of total national expenditure (National
Treasury, 2001). This translates to R108 per household per
annum (National Treasury, 2001). It has been estimated
that the typical cost of providing a “basket of basic services”
(water supply, sanitation, electricity and solid waste) ranges
from R840 per household per month in rural areas to
R1,080 in urban areas1 (Palmer Development Group,
2002). Therefore, it can be seen that this allocation from the
national fiscus should be increased eight to ten-fold if it is
to adequately cover the purposes for which it is intended.
In government’s medium-term estimate, local government’s
share of national revenue will only increase to 3.3% by
2003/2004 (National Treasury, 2001).
The relationship between national and local
government
As national government sets the legislative and policy
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environment, decentralisation is unlikely to be successful
unless there is genuine ownership and commitment from a
national level (Saito, 2001). One of the greatest aspects of
decentralisation in South Africa is the strong support it
appears to have from national government. The legislative
and policy environment, therefore, assigns significant powers
and functions to local government. However, at an
implementation level, national departments such as DWAF
have for various reasons made slow progress in decentralising
functions, assets and staff to local government. Thus,
despite the generally favourable policy environment, there
are problems in implementation.
Decentralisation needs time
The simplest, but perhaps most relevant lesson of
international decentralisation processes to South Africa, is
that wide-ranging institutional change requires time to
effect properly. Of the cases examined by Crook and
Sverrisson (2001), the case that demonstrated the best link
between decentralisation and pro-poor outcomes was West
Bengal, which has had a decentralised system for 20 years.
In South Africa, which has recently undergone enormous
political and social, it is unrealistic to expect the system to
already start delivering positive outcomes across the board.
Institutional capacity building programmes aimed at local
government must be cognisant of realistic timeframes for
implementation.
Impediments to decentralisation in the
policy environment
Sector roles and responsibilities require further
clarifying
South Africa has now gone through a period of time that
has allowed water services institutions to test out the limits
of their institutional powers and responsibilities. Many
lessons have been learnt from this experience and long-term
sector institutional arrangements can be consolidated. Key
issues that need urgent attention are:
• defining DWAF’s future regulatory and oversight role;
• clarifying the overlaps in responsibility between national
and provincial government as well as between district
and local municipalities;
• deciding whether local government is the correct body
to be responsible for both urban and rural water
services or, whether greater economies of scale and
efficiencies might be achieved through institutions with
larger areas of jurisdiction (regional utilities for example);
• broadening the options for service delivery by removing
constraints in legislation and policy that inhibit private
sector participation and community management.
DWAF requires an institutional development
strategy
DWAF has been innovative and bold in its institutional
support to local government. However, these initiatives
have not been supported by a coherent institutional
development strategy. DWAF needs to bring together the
approaches and tools that it is currently applying into a
coherent strategy or guideline package to support its
programmes. This package should set out DWAF’s
institutional development priorities (in terms of both
geographical areas and types of institutions), its human and
financial resource commitments, targets and indicators for
measuring success and timeframes. This will give guidance
to both DWAF officials and other institutional development
practitioners in the sector.
Create an enabling environment for community
management
The main issue with regards to CBOs as water services
providers is that they are currently categorised in legislation
along with the private sector. This means that according to
the law, a CBO would have to undergo a competitive
tendering process in order to be appointed. There are also
a number of impediments in labour legislation (which has
been developed with an urban context in mind) that would
technically preclude employment of staff by CBOs. A
further threat to CBOs is the position adopted by organised
labour that all municipal services should be delivered by
municipal staff (COSATU, 1998). This stance, alongside a
suspicion of CBOs amongst local government officials and
politicians, creates a difficult environment for CBOs.
Yet another challenge is the implementation of the free
basic water policy, which effectively means that in poor
rural areas, all water would be provided for free.
Internationally, revenue collection is accepted as being the
mechanism by which a community owns a scheme and
holds the CBO accountable. Breaking this link between the
service provider and the consumer has serious implications
for ownership and accountability of community managed
rural schemes. Despite this, there has been a number of
extremely successful CBO managed schemes in South
Africa. However, many of these pre-dated the legislation or
were implemented by ignoring the prevailing legislative and
policy environment. Thus, rural water supply in South
Africa is very much at a crossroads, with international
experience of demand-responsive community managed
schemes not being adopted, and yet, without any other
credible long-term alternative.
In order to address the poor enabling environment for
community management of schemes, legislation needs to
be reviewed to make it appropriate to a rural context,
where the majority of the poor live. This can be achieved by
making procurement processes flexible, and giving more
discretion to individual municipalities to tailor the processes
1 The costs in urban areas are higher because the “basic” level of service defined for water supply in urban areas is different for that in rural
areas.
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to their specific needs. Non-statutory guidelines can assist
municipalities to do this. The possibility of exempting
CBOs from strict adherence to national labour legislation
should also be examined. In all likelihood these
recommendations would be opposed by organised labour
as a matter of principle; however, government needs to
acknowledge that the CBO model is often the only way of
achieving sustainable water services in remote rural areas.
Clarify the role of the Private sector
Through the requirements for the procurement of municipal
services and certain regulatory provisions, which allow
ministerial discretion on tariffs, legislation not only favours
public sector provision, but does not promote private
sector investment in water services. Government has to
some extent tried to address these issues in policy, and the
major public-private partnerships that exist in South Africa
today have possibly been entered into on the basis of
government policy that is expected to favour private sector
investment. The Draft Water Services White Paper (DWAF,
2002) does acknowledge the need for private sector
involvement, but fails to address the legislative impediments.
Given that government policy does see private sector
investment and private sector management of services as an
option, a policy process needs to be undertaken to identify
those areas of legislation and policy that impede this
involvement. This process should look at water sector and
local government legislation as well as labour legislation.
This policy process should make recommendations to
amend legislation that will still maintain the public sector
provision as the preferred option, but that does not
discourage private sector involvement or saddle them with
unacceptable risks.
Conclusion
It is clear that South Africa has made tangible progress
towards decentralising service delivery in water supply and
sanitation to local government level. However, there are a
number of impediments at legislative, policy and programme
levels that need to be resolved.
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